INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1133 the narrowest possible grounds." 1 Conversely, the paucity of dissenting opinions highlights the dissents that are published. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once explained, " [t] he scope of a Supreme Court decision is not infrequently revealed by the candor of dissent." 2 Focused dissents can therefore illuminate core distinctions among the justices, as they illustrate crucial areas where the justices are willing to take the uncommon step of deviating from the rest of the Court.
Second, the Court's docket remains as robust as it has in previous years. The Court handed down 100 opinions in 2014. This was an increase from the 74 in 2013. Over the past five years, the Court has averaged 94.2 opinions per year. The Court's work in 2014 gives no reason to believe that number will change. Indeed, the Court granted 89 new transfer cases in 2014, more than in 2013 and 2012.
Third, the Court's work remains split relatively evenly between civil and criminal cases. In 2014, 58% of its cases arose in civil cases after the grant of transfer. The percentage of the Court's cases arose in the civil context in 60 civil cases in 2012, while the Court's caseload was almost evenly split in 2013.
Only the coming years (and even decades) can give us a complete picture of the Rush Court. But 2014 serves as an early sign that many of the celebrated characteristics of the Court on which practitioners rely have remained unchanged.
Table A. The Court issued exactly 100 opinions in 2014, up from the 74 opinions issued in 2013 and more in line with the 103 opinions handed down in 2012. For the past five years, the Court has averaged 94.2 opinions per year, a number surely affected by the anomalous year in 2013 when the Court was experiencing rapid changes. The Court again handed down more civil cases than criminal cases, as 58% of the opinions came in civil cases. The Court has handed down more civil than criminal cases in every year since 2007. For the second year in a row, Justice David authored the most opinions with a total of 21. He has handed down either the most or the second most opinions every year after 2011. Justice Rucker remains an outspoken voice in dissent, as he authored the most dissenting opinions in 2014. Justice Rucker authored dissents in five cases, which was half of the 10 separate dissenting opinions in 2014. He has either authored the most dissents or tied for the most dissents every year since 2010. INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1135
cases. At no prior point in the past decade have all five justices agreed with each of their colleagues in at least 90% of civil cases. Although the Shepard-era court was known for its ability to form consensus, the current Court outpaces it in the level of agreement among the justices. For instance, in 2012-the last year that Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Sullivan were on the Court-the least aligned justices agreed in 57% of cases and the second least amount of alignment was 64%. Chief Justice Rush was in the majority for all three of the 2014 split decisions, and Justices Massa and David were in the majority for two of the split decisions. This Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for only civil cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for Justice Massa, 58 is the number of times Justice Massa and Chief Justice Dickson agreed in a full majority opinion in a civil case. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The Table does not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement.
"O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." This Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for only criminal cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for Justice Massa, 36is the number of times former Justice Massa and Chief Justice Dickson agreed in a full majority opinion in a criminal case. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The Table does not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement.
"O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N."
INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1133 Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for all cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for former Justice Massa, 94 is the total number of times former Justice Massa and Chief Justice Dickson agreed in all full majority opinions written by the court in 2014. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The Table does not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement.
"O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." A decision is considered unanimous only when all justices participating in the case voted to concur in the court's opinion, as well as its judgment. When one or more justices concurred in the result, but not in the opinion, the case is not considered unanimous. j A decision is listed in this column if one or more justices concurred in the result, but not in the opinion of the court or wrote a concurrence, and there were no dissents. Generally, the Indiana Supreme Court uses the term "vacate" when it is reviewing a court of appeals opinion, and the term "reverse" when the court overrules a trial court decision. A point to consider in reviewing this Table is that the court technically "vacates" every court of appeals opinion that is accepted for transfer, but may only disagree with a small portion of the reasoning and still agree with the result. See IND. APP. R. 58(A). As a practical matter, "reverse" or "vacate" simply represents any action by the court that does not affirm the trial court or court of appeals's opinion.
